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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As a young attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the United
States (U.S.) Department of State during the 1960s, I had the privilege and
the pleasure of working with Don McHenry, then a young foreign service
reserve officer and later U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to
the United Nations (U.N.). His work dealt with legal issues arising from
the actions of a white minority government in Southern Rhodesia-about
six percent of the population-that exhibited little willingness to share
power with the black majority and that imposed a number of restraints on
their economic, social, educational, and legal rights. In particular, on
November 11, 1965, Southern Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom, which had residual
administrative responsibility over Southern Rhodesia, which was classified
under the U.N. Charter as a non-self-governing territory rather than a
British colony.' The United Nations Security Council, after taking a variety
of preliminary steps, ultimately determined that the situation in Southern
Rhodesia had become a threat to the peace and authorized the United
Kingdom to use force, if necessary, to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia.2
The Council next decided to adopt limited economic sanctions under
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1.

For detailed discussion, see JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL

OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE 139-42 (1982).
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S.C. Res. 217,15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
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Article 41 of the U.N. Charter, and then, in its Resolution 253 of May 29,
1968, the Council adopted more detailed and specific sanctions.
Criticism of the Security Council's resolutions was intense. No less a
personage than Dean Acheson, Secretary of State under President Harry
Truman and head of a leading Washington, D.C. law firm, focused his
primary attack on the Council's finding that the situation in Southern
Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security.' In his
view, actions taken by the Southern Rhodesian regime entirely within its
own territory could not constitute a threat to international peace and
security. Rather, the threat to international peace and security, if any, came
from black African states that threatened to intervene militarily. Hence,
Acheson argued, if any sanctions were called for, they should be directed
against these black African states and not against Southern Rhodesia. He
also argued strenuously that the Security Council's action constituted a
clear violation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits the
United Nations from intervening in "matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state. ... " In response, defenders of the
Council's sanctions, including the U.S. Government, contended that, under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, a threat to the peace could consist of a
situation, as well as "the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state" prohibited by Article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter.7 The situation in Southern Rhodesia, the argument
continued, threatened the peace in two ways. First, the threat of internal
violence in Southern Rhodesia was so great that any outbreak of violence
3.

U.N. Charter art. 41 provides that:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.
3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968).

4.

S.C. Res. 253,

5.

Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of InternationalLawyers, 2 INT'L LAWYER 591, 591-99

(1968).
6.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Id. 1 4; Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations:
7.
The Lawflness of InternationalConcern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-19 (1968) (discussing this point and
several other arguments in support of the sanctions).
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was likely to be of such intensity and magnitude that it would spill over to
the territory of adjoining states. Second, the "racist" actions of the white
minority had so inflamed passions in neighboring black African states that
indirect support of guerrillas and even direct military intervention was
likely. It was also noted that the UDI represented an illegal rebellion
against British authority and that nearly all member states of the United
Nations regarded the regime as illegal and in flagrant violation of
fundamental international human rights norms.' Finally, the defenders of
the sanctions pointed out that Southern Rhodesia was not a state but a
territory, and thus Article 2(7) was inapplicable by its terms.
It is worth noting that, in sharp contrast to the cases of Libya and the
Ivory Coast, the use of armed force against Southern Rhodesia was never
contemplated by the Security Council. It is also worth noting, however,
that although the proposition is debatable, it appears that on the whole,
economic sanctions had relatively little effect on Southern Rhodesia and
that guerrilla activity played a much more substantial role in inducing the
Southern Rhodesian regime to agree ultimately to a peaceful transition of
power-despite the claim of Ian Smith, the leader of the Southern
Rhodesian regime, that "not in a thousand years would blacks govern
Rhodesia." 9
Despicable as apartheid was, the Security Council, consistently with
its actions regarding Southern Rhodesia, never seriously contemplated
authorizing the use of armed force. Indeed, western powers, including the
United States, resisted efforts in the Council to impose a Rhodesia-style
embargo against South Africa, only agreeing in 1977 to the Council
imposing a mandatory embargo on arm sales to South Africa.'o
During the cold war years, there were a number of horrific human
rights atrocities that exceeded in significant measure those committed under
apartheid. But as noted by Gareth Evans, in his superb study, "[t]he
dynamics of the cold war constituted a third factor [standing in the way of
8.
The United States Government especially emphasized Southern Rhodesia's illegal
rebellion against British authority in order to distinguish the situation in Southern Rhodesia from that in
South Africa, whose apartheid policy was an even more severe example of discrimination on the basis
of race than were Southern Rhodesia's racially based policies. At the time of the UDI the United States
Government was unwilling to apply mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII against South
Africa.
9.
See MURPHY, supra note 1, at 142 (stating that on February 27, 1980, an election
supervised by the British government with observers from the Commonwealth countries was held and
resulted in a landside victory for the party of Robert Mugabe, who along with Joshua Nkomo, had been
the leader of the Patriotic Front, the guerrilla movement. Six months later, on August 25, Rhodesia,
newly named Zimbabwe, became a member of the United Nations).
10.

See generally S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov. 4, 1977).
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effective action to prevent or bring to an end such atrocities], dominating
the U.N. system almost from the start and hamstringing the organization
when it came to dealing with mass atrocities."" Both the United States and
the Soviet Union focused their attention on ensuring that their respective
alliance blocs were functioning and resisted placing any sanctions on
misbehaving partners.12 As a result, "although in the immediate aftermath
of the Holocaust the world had started to institutionalize its collective
conscience, during the cold war decades that followed cynicism trumped
conscience every time the major powers faced a serious choice.""
The end of the cold war brought its own challenges. In particular, the
military interventions in the 1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and
Kosovo posed major problems and together, as Evans suggested, threw
"into stark relief every one of the conceptual, operational, and political will
issues with which this book wrestles."l 4
For its part, Somalia broke out into clan based civil war when
President Siad Barre was overthrown in January 1991 after losing, with the
end of the cold war, the protection he had enjoyed first from the Soviet
Union and then from the United States.' 5 Initially, a small United Nations'
peacekeeping force was dispatched to Somalia in April 1992 to support
relief operations. But six months later, the U.N. Secretary-General was
telling the Security Council that 1.5 million Somalis were immediately at
risk of death and many more threatened by starvation and disease and that a
fully empowered peace enforcement operation was required. The Council
responded promptly and effectively to the Secretary-General's request, and
11.

GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 21 (2008).

Id. at 21-22 (noting in this connection the "he-may-be-a-son-of-a-bitch-but -he's-our-son12.
of-a-bitch" syndrome).
13.
Id. at 22. Among the situations where cynicism trumped conscience were the following
noted by Evans:
[T]he Indonesian massacres of up to 500,000 or more Communist Party members,
suspected sympathizers, and others caught up in the mayhem from 1965 to 1966;
the hunting down and killing of more than 100,000 Hutu in Burundi between
April and September 1972; tens of thousands of forced "disappearances" of
political dissenters during the 'Dirty War' in Argentina of 1976-83 and Pinochet's
Operation Candor during the mid-1970s; the massacre in Guatemala from 1981 to
1983 of some 150,000 Mayans and the destruction of over 400 villages in
government counterinsurgency operations; the series of mass murders perpetrated
in Zimbabwe's Matabeleland from 1982 from 1987 (sic), believed to have killed
over 10,000 and as many as 30,000; and the poison gas attack by Saddam
Hussein's Iraqi air force on the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, in which
some 5,000 perished.
14.

Id. at 26.

15.

Id. at 27 (giving a summary of the situation in Somalia).
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"[b]y the end of the year, 28,000 U.S.-led troops were on the ground." 6
The Non-Aligned Movement fully supported the creation of this force and,
surprisingly, even China cast its first affirmative vote for an enforcement
resolution.17 The mission was basically successful in that assistance in one
form or another did reach the entire population of five million, and less than
100,000 of those threatened actually died. Tragically, however, this
successful endeavor was completely undermined by subsequent events. As
summarized by Evans, these included:
[T]he misconceived attempt to wage war against militia leaders,
followed by the "Black Hawk Down" debacle in Mogadishu in
October 1993, in which 18 Americans died. Subsequently, U.S.
troops were pulled out, and the U.N. mission was finally
withdrawn in April 1995, with most of its objectives unachieved
and a nasty taste in the mouths of a number of troop contributors
about their humanitarian intervention experience.' 8
The so-called "Mogadishu effect" caused the major powers, including
especially the United States, to be reluctant to respond effectively to events
unfolding in Rwanda in 1994.19
Shortly after a plane carrying Rwandan president Juvenal
Habyarimana was shot down on April 6, reports were received in United
Nations' headquarters and in Washington, D.C. about massive ethnic-based
violence in Rwanda and the desperate need to mount a fully employed
military enforcement operation to stop it.20 But no such enforcement
operation was created. To the contrary, "Belgium withdrew its contingent
entirely, and the Security Council actually drew down troops already on the
ground." 21 As a result, "some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were
slaughtered in less than four months, an unequivocal case of genocide in

16.

EvANS, supra note II, at 27.

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id. at 27-28 (giving a summary of the situation in Rwanda).

20.

21.

Id.
Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, who commanded the light peacekeeping
mission established a year earlier to monitor recently signed peace accords, made
heroic efforts to save those he could and argued strenuously that just 5,000 wellarmed and trained troops--together with measures such as the external jamming
of hate-radio frequencies-could stop hundreds of thousands of murders. But he
was ignored.....
a
EVANS, supra note 11, at 28.
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any lawyer's language and by far the worst since the Holocaust."22
President Bill Clinton later apologized for the United States' inaction.2 3
Difficulties associated with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in
1991 have posed challenges to the international community that continue to
this day. As I have previously noted in a different forum:
[. . .] In the wake of "the shock waves of a collapsed Soviet
Union that reverberated throughout Central and Eastern Europe,"
on June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their
independence. On June 27, armed forces controlled by Serbia
attacked the provisional Slovenia militia, and by July had
initiated hostilities in Croatia. The response of the Security
Council, on September 25, was the unanimous adoption of a
resolution that expressed support for the collective efforts of the
European Community and the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe to resolve the conflict. By the same
resolution, the Council decided under Chapter VII of the Charter
to impose an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment. There was no suggestion in the resolution that an
international act of aggression had taken place. By early 1992,
however, most of the former Yugoslavian republics had attained
international recognition, thus turning what had begun as an
internal conflict into an international conflict.
In January 1992, special U.N. envoys had managed to secure a
cease-fire in Croatia. The result, however, was to shift the locus
of the fighting to the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
contained a majority of Muslims in its population, but which also
contained substantial Serbian and Croatian minorities. In 1992,
those minorities were supplied with extensive military assistance
for use against the Bosnian army. Serbia in particular was
actively involved in providing the Bosnian Serbs with significant
firepower. Perversely, the arms embargo imposed against the
former Yugoslavia, as a whole, greatly undermined Bosnia's
ability to obtain arms to defend itself. In April 1992, Serb forces
launched an attack against Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia and
commenced the "ethnic cleansing" and other atrocities that
ultimately caused the Security Council to create the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to prosecute the people
responsible.

22.

Id.

23.
Chido Nwangwu, Rwanda's Anti-GenocideActivist Speaks in the US. This Week; Clinton
Apologizes, Again, USAFRICA ONLINE, (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.usafricaonline.com/
2009/11/01/rwandan-anti-genocide-activist-paul-speaks-in-us-nov4/#print (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).

Murphy

2012]

In February 1992, the Security Council had authorized the
creation of a U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Initially, it
was envisioned that this force would be interposed, in classic
peacekeeping fashion, between the Serbian and Croatian forces
that had been fighting in Croatia, as one step to an overall
UNPROFOR's mandate was later extended to
settlement.
Bosnia-Herzegovina. On December 11, 1992, the Security
Council approved a deployment of 700 U.N. personnel to
Macedonia, another former Yugoslavian republic-the first time
U.N. peacekeepers had been deployed as an exercise of
"preventive diplomacy."
In March 1993, the United States, in coordination with the
United Nations, began supplying food and medicine by air to
Muslim enclaves in Bosnia-Herzegovina that could not be
reached by land. In April and May 1993, the Security Council
established six of these enclaves as "safe areas" for Bosnian
civilians. UNPROFOR was given a mandate to use force "to
enable it to deter attacks against those areas, to occupy certain
key points on the ground to this end, and to reply to
bombardments against the safe areas." This mandate envisaged a
use of force that went beyond that traditionally utilized by UN
peacekeeping forces. To carry out this mandate, the SecretaryGeneral estimated that UNPROFOR would need an additional
34,000 troops at a cost of $20 million for the first six months and
$26 million per month thereafter. But no such additional troops
As a result, UNPROFOR was simply
were forthcoming.
incapable of protecting the so-called safe areas in Bosnia. This
was most tragically demonstrated on July 11, 1995, when
Bosnian Serb forces overran the U.N.-designated safe area of
Srebrenica, captured 430 Dutch members of UNPROFOR, and
massacred Muslim civilians in such numbers that it was "said to
be the worst atrocity in Europe since World War II."
It was only after the (NATO) finally decided to bomb heavily [.
.] Serb positions, coupled with the use of Croatian ground
troops, that it became possible to enforce a peaceful settlement.
The peacekeeping force was established to implement the peace
agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was negotiated in
Dayton, Ohio and signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris. The
force operates under NATO auspices. By resolution, the Security
Council authorized the NATO peacekeeping force to replace
United Nations' peacekeepers in Bosnia and to take "such
enforcement

action

. . . as may be necessary to ensure

This new
implementation" of the peace agreements.
peacekeeping group, or Implementation Force IFOR, unlike the

419
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hapless UNPROFOR, had the wherewithal (in the form of, e.g.,
60,000 troops) to serve as an enforcement force.24
NATO soon was faced with another challenge in the former
Yugoslavia. In 1998, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic began a
campaign using police units to crush ethnic Albanian separatist sentiment in
the Serbian province of Kosovo once and for all. 25 There were many
months of allegations and counter-allegations about Serb and Kosovo
Liberation Army behavior, but Russia and China would not accept any
Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. After efforts to
solve the problem through diplomatic means, the United States and its
NATO allies decided to act on their own and commenced a campaign of air
strikes against Serbia. As nicely noted by Evans, "[t]he seventy-eight days
of destructive bombing produced a flood of refugees and internal
displacements, and a surge of further killings-some thousands in all-by
the Serbs, but a settlement was reached only when NATO finally threatened
the insertion of ground troops."2 6
II. EMERGENCE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
"The debate over the legality and morality of U.S. and NATO actions

with respect to Kosovo has been fierce. Moreover, the writings on this
subject have been legion." 27 This is not the time nor the place to review
these writings. 2 8 For present purposes, it suffices that one of the issues
raised by NATO actions with respect to Kosovo, and indeed by
developments with respect to Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, is the validity,
or lack thereof, of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. As he so often
does with various issues, Evans highlights this issue in sharp perspective:
The 1990s was the decade in which every one of the central
questions surrounding humanitarian intervention was, for the first
time, exposed with real clarity. But it ended with absolutely no
consensus on any of the answers. Every general discussion in the
General Assembly and other international forums, and nearly
every difficult individual case that arose, became a political
24.
JOHN F. MURPHY, THE EVOLVING DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: HARD CHOICES
FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY 124-26 (2010).
25.

EVANS, supranote 11, at 29 (giving a summary of the situation in Kosovo).

26.

Id.

27.

See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS 154 (2004).
28.

See id. at 154-61 (providing my own highly negative view on United States and NATO

actions with respect to Kosovo).
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battlefield with two warring armies. On the one side were those,
mostly from the global North, who, in situations of catastrophic
human rights violations, could not see beyond humanitarian
intervention, "the right to intervene" with military force. On the
other side were those, mostly from the global South, who were
often prepared to concede that grave human rights violations
were occurring but were resolutely determined to maintain the
continued resonance, and indeed primacy, of the traditional
nonintervention concept of national sovereignty. Battle lines
were drawn, trenches were dug, and verbal missiles flew. The
debate was intense and very bitter, and the twentieth century
ended with it utterly unresolved in the U.N. or anywhere else.29
By way to transition to the concept of the R2P, Evans quotes a
statement by Kofi Annan, in his 2000 Millennium Report of the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations: "If humanitarian intervention is indeed an
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda,
to a Srebrenica-to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
offend every precept of our common humanity?', 30 Annan's challenge
stimulated the Canadian government to take action.31 On the initiative of
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, it appointed an international
commission titled The International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS), which began its work in September 2000 and
published its report just over a year later, in December 2001.32 The
Commission was co-chaired by Evans and the Algerian diplomat Mohamed
Sahnoun.
It is important to note that the R2P, as developed in great detail in the
ICISS report, is different from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
As Jos6 Alvarez has explained:
The Responsibility to protect concept was borne out of
frustration with the international community's repeated failure to
intervene in cases of on-going mass atrocity, in particular in
Rwanda and Kosovo. The concept sought to deflect attention
from the controverted "right" of some states to intervene, to the

29.

See EVANS, supra note 11, at 30.

30.

Id. at31.

31.

Id. at 38.

32.
See id. See generally INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001) [hereinafter ICISS].
33.

ICISS, supra note 32, at III.
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duties of all states to protect their own citizens from avoidable
catastrophes and for third parties to come to the rescue. 34
Recognizing the pivotal role of the ICISS report, Alvarez further
explains:
As that Commission conceived it, the virtue of R2P was that it
would entice states to engage in humanitarian relief by shifting
the emphasis from the politically unattractive right of state
interveners to the less threatening idea of "responsibility." R2P
put the focus on the peoples at grave risk of harm rather than on
the rights of states. It also stressed that responsibility was
shared-as between the primary duty of states to protect their
own populations and the secondary duty of the wider
community.
According to the ICISS report, the R2P "embraces three specific
responsibilities." These include:
A)

The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root
causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other manmade crises putting populations at risk.
B) The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of
compelling human need with appropriate measures, which
may include coercive measures like sanctions and
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military
intervention.
C) The responsibilityto rebuild: to provide, particularly after a
military intervention, full assistance with recovery,
reconstruction, and reconciliation, addressing the causes of
the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.37
The ICISS report emphasizes that "[p]revention is the single most
important dimension of the responsibility to protect . . . " and "[t]he

exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always
involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more
coercive and intrusive ones are applied."38 Evans gives examples of means

34.

See Jost E. ALVAREZ, THE SCHIZOPHRENIAS OF R2P, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION

AND THE USE OF FORCE (Philip Alston & E. MacDonald eds., 2008).
35.

Id.

36.

ICISS, supra note 32, at XI.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.
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to carry out the responsibility to prevent:
"building state capacity,
remedying grievances, and ensuring the rule of law."39
Most of the scholarly literature on R2P has focused on the dimension
of responsibility to protect, which involves military intervention in order to
stop the commission of atrocities. In contrast, there has been relatively
little consideration in the academy of the responsibility to prevent element
of the R2P.4 0 At the same time, it is worth noting that there have been
encouraging recent developments in sub-Saharan Africa that give hope in
many African countries that violence and resulting atrocities will be less
likely to break out. Such developments include, among others, positive
economic growth rates-in per capita terms-since the late 1990s, a
majority of African countries holding multi-party elections for the first
time, an unprecedented improvement in the extent of civic and media
freedom, and significant improvements in education. 4 1
But the focus of the panel on "R2P Comes of Age?," at International
Law Weekend on October 21, 2011, was not on the responsibility to
prevent. Rather, the panel addressed the issue of whether R2P had come of
age as result of the use of armed force authorized by the U.N. Security
Council to bring to an end atrocities in Libya and in the Ivory Coast. My
answer on the panel and in this essay was and is an emphatic "No!"
To begin a consideration of this issue, one should first take note of
R2P as it was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in its 2005 World
Summit Outcome document.42 R2P appears in paragraphs 138 and 139 of
the Outcome document, two relatively short paragraphs set forth in full
below. Heads of state and government attending the 60th session of the
U.N. General Assemblyl4-6 September 2005 agreed as follows:
Responsibility To Protect Populations From Genocide, War
Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing, And Crimes Against Humanity
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity.
This responsibility entails the

39.

See EVANS, supra note 11, at 43.

40.
It should be noted that Kish Vinayagamoorthy, who is serving as a Visiting Assistant
Professor at the Villanova University School of Law, is working on a paper that seeks to fill this gap,
with particular emphasis on the situation in Asia.
41.
See Edward Miguel, Africa Unleashed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Nov./Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136547/edward-miguellafrica-unleashed (last visited Feb. 17,
2012); See also Oliver August, A Sub-SaharanSpring?, EcoNoMIsT, Nov. 17, 2011, at 76.
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept.
42.
16, 2005) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 60/1]; See also Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political
Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (2007).
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prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through
appropriate and necessary means. We accept the responsibility
and will act in accordance with it. The international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an
early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations,
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian, and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. We stress the
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as
necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to assisting those
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 43
The World Summit Outcome document was adopted unanimously by
the U.N. General Assembly, but the strength of support for R2P was not as
substantial as this vote would seem to indicate. Evans reports that "a fierce
rearguard action was fought almost to the last by a small group of
developing countries, joined by Russia, who basically refused to concede
any kind of limitation on the full and untrammeled exercise of state
sovereignty, however irresponsible that exercise might be."" Evans further
suggests that U.S. and British support for R2P "was not particularly helpful
in allaying the familiar sovereignty concerns of the South, against the
background of the deeply unpopular coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003."4'

43.

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 42, IN 138-39.

44.

EVANS, supra note 11, at 49.

45.

Id. at 50.
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For his part, Alvarez refers to the "strange bedfellows," namely, the
controversial John Bolton, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement that endorsed the idea of R2P. 6
He also suggests that:
[T]here must be something wrong as well as right with an idea
that can be endorsed by such strange bedfellows, and there is.
R2P's normative "legs" result from its not always consistent,
various iterationS47 as well as from the lack of clarity as to
whether it is a legal or merely political concept. It means too
many things to too many people.48
Perhaps the most significant issue arising from the various iterations of
R2P is whether, in the absence of Security Council authorization, individual
states may invoke the doctrine of humanitarian intervention to protect
populations in other states from the enumerated crimes. The report of the
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change appears, although it is
not absolutely clear, to require Security Council authorization for the use of
armed force to protect persons from the enumerated crimes. 4 9 There is little
doubt that the International Commission on Intervention and State
46.

ALVAREZ, supra note 34, at 49.

47.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 1 201-03, U.N. Doc. A159/565 (Dec. 2,
2004) [hereinafter Report of the High-Level Panel] (referring to an "emerging norm of collective
responsibility to protect"); U.N. Secretary-General, In LargerFreedom, Towards Development, Security
and Human Rightsfor All, 1 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005).
ALVAREZ, supra note 34, at 49; See also Mehrdad Payandeh, With Great Power Comes
48.
Great Responsibility? The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of International
Lawmaking, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 469 (2010) for an excellent and extensive Student Note that concludes
that the responsibility to protect is not a legal concept but rather a political concept that nonetheless may
have a significant impact on international legal processes. In the conclusion to his Note Payandeh
states:
From a legal perspective, the normative content of the responsibility is . . .
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The responsibility to protect is construed
primarily as a nonlegal concept. It is an attempt to establish a more concrete set
of criteria and procedures to determine when the responsibility of the
international community to intervene is triggered. Responsibility in this sense
cannot be equated with a legal obligation or duty, but has to be understood as a
political or moral responsibility. This assessment is not meant to diminish the
significance of the concept. Political and moral implications may have a much
greater impact on the conduct of international actors than legal norms. The
responsibility to protect may encourage governments to act in the face of blatant
violations of human rights.
Id. at 515.
49.

See Report of the High-Level Panel, supranote 47; See also Stahn, supra note 42.
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Sovereignty viewed the Security Council "as the only legal source of
authority (self-defense aside) for the use of force....
It is unclear, however, whether the World Summit Outcome document
requires Security Council authorization for the use of armed force under
R2P. Paragraph 79 of the Outcome document states "that the relevant
provisions of the [U.N.] Charter are sufficient to address the full range of
threats to international peace and security. We further reaffirm the
authority of the Security Council to mandate coercive action to maintain
and restore international peace and security."5 1 Interpreting this language,
Frederic L. Kirgis has suggested that the:
[L]eaders appear to be saying that no Charter amendments are
needed in order to enable the U.N. to deal with threats to the
peace . . . that were not contemplated when the Charter was

drawn up. Possibly, but not clearly, they were also saying that
apart from uses of armed force expressly recognized in the
Charter (Security Council authorization under Chapter VII or
self-defense in case of an armed attack), coercive action to deal
with a threat to the peace could not be justified under the
Charter.52
Similarly, elsewhere in his American Society of International Law
(ASIL) Insight, Kirgis quotes paragraph 139 of the Outcome document,
where the world leaders stated that they:
[A]re prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the
U.N. Charter, including Chapter VII, on case by case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate,
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law.53
He then notes that "[t]he legitimacy of humanitarian intervention
without Security Council approval is controversial. Whether the world
50.

EVANS, supra note 11, at 64.

51.

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 42, I 138-39.

52.
Frederic L. Kirgis, International Law Aspects of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document, AM. SoC'Y OF INT'L LAW, (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/
insights051004.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
53.

G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 42, IM138-39.

Murphy

2012]

427

leaders intended to address it in Paragraph 139 (or in Paragraph 79,
discussed above) is unclear."54
At the time of this writing, the issue addressed by Kirgis has not come
up in practice, although the deteriorating situation in Syria may bring it to
the fore.5 As we shall see below, in the cases of both Libya and the Ivory
Coast, the Security Council authorized the use of force, although the extent
of this authorization, especially in the case of Libya, was an issue.
A. R2P, Libya, andthe Ivory Coast
Although it is by no means the first example of a revolution sparked
by such social media as Facebook and texting by cell phones, 6 the eruption
of demonstrations and revolutionary fervor in early 2011 in the Middle East
set off by a street vendor in Tunisia setting himself on fire in protest of
harassment by Tunisian police is surely the most spectacular.57 In this socalled Arab Spring, text messages about and pictures of the street vendor's
self-immolation spread rapidly throughout the Middle East and were part of
several developments that led to the early removal of the leaders of Egypt
and Tunisia, the outbreak of armed conflict in Libya, Yemen, and Syria,
and demonstrations in Bahrain, Jordan, and elsewhere.58 They also led to
the Security Council taking action with respect to Libya and the Ivory Coast

54.

Kirgis, supra note 52, at 4.

55.
See, e.g., Nada Bakri, Arab League Warns Syria to Admit Foreign Monitors or Risk
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2011, at Al0. In this article, the N.Y. Times reports that the Arab
League called on Syria to agree by November 25, 2011 to admit a mission of 500 civilian and military
observers to monitor the human rights situation and oversee efforts to carry out a peace plan that Syria
agreed to on November 2 or face economic sanctions. Syrian state television reportedly stated that the
government would reject the demands as an infringement on its sovereignty. In contrast to their stance
on Libya, the Arab League has so far opposed any military intervention in Syria.
56.
Clay Shirky, The PoliticalPower of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and
Political Change, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Jan./Feb. 2011), available at http://www.gpia.info/files/
ul392/ShirkyPoliticalPoewr of Social Media.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). According to Clay
Shirky, the first time that social media had helped to force out a national leader was when Philippine
President Joseph Estrada was removed from office in 2001. In response to a vote by the Philippine
Congress during the impeachment trial of Estrada to set aside evidence against him, within two hours
after the vote, thousands of Filipinos took to the streets in protest. Encouraged in part by close to seven
million text messages during the week, the crowd grew in several days to over a million people, choking
traffic in downtown Manila. The Philippine Congress reversed its vote and Estrada was gone.
57.
See generally Rania Abouzied, Bouazizi: The Man Who Set Himselfand Tunisia on Fire,
TIME, (Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
58.

See Shirky, supranote 56.
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that constituted the first exercises of the R2P that involved the use of armed
force. 9
B. Libya and R2P
Reacting quickly to the outbreak of armed conflict in Libya and
reports of the use of force by the Libyan government against civilians, on
February 26, 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution
1970.60 In its preamble, Resolution 1970 expressed grave concern at the
situation in Libya, condemned the violence and use of force against
civilians, considered that these attacks might amount to crimes against
humanity, and recalled the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect their
population. 6 1 Then, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and
taking measures under Article 41 of the Charter,6 2 the Council, among other
things, expressed the hope that those responsible for these crimes would be
brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) and referred to the
ICC's Prosecutor.
It imposed sanctions against Colonel Al Gaddafi,
members of his family and his accomplices." Lastly, it imposed an
embargo on arms destined for Libya.s
It is perhaps surprising that the Security Council unanimously decided
to refer the situation in Libya to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, in light of the brouhaha that broke out in reaction to the Court's
issuance of arrest warrants against Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, the president of
the Sudan. Indeed, Resolution 1970 is a bit schizophrenic on the referral
because in its preamble the resolution recalls, "article 16 of the Rome
Statute [the charter of the ICC] under which no investigation or prosecution

59.
Res. 1970].

See generally S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter S.C.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

U.N. Charter art. 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.

63.

S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 59.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66. See John F. Murphy, Gulliver No Longer Quivers: US. Views on and the Future of the
InternationalCriminal Court,44 INT'L L. 1123, 1136-37 (2010).
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may be commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court
for a period of 12 months after a Security Council request to that effect."67
There was an effort after the ICC issued its arrest warrants against AlBashir to get the Security Council to take action under Article 16 of the
Rome Statute, but the threat of a U.S. and British veto blocked the adoption
of any such action. 8 Despite the ICC's difficulties with respect to the
arrest warrants it issued against Al-Bashir, on June 27, 2011, the ICC's PreTrial Chamber I issued three arrest warrants for crimes against humanitymurder and persecution-allegedly committed in Libya, from February 15,
2011 until at least February 28, 2011, against Muammar Gaddafi, Seif alSlam Gaddafi, his son, and Abdullah Senussi, the chief of military
intelligence and Muammar Gaddafi's brother-in-law.
The sanctions against the Libyan government and the threat of
prosecution by the ICC failed to halt its attacks on its population and led the
Security Council to adopt, on March 17, 2011, Resolution 1973.70 In that
resolution, the Council authorized the use of armed force against the Libyan
government and thereby raised an issue regarding the operational viability
of the responsibility to protect.
Before considering Resolution 1973 in more detail, it is important to
note that prior to consideration of the resolution in draft form, the League of
Arab States called on the Security Council in a resolution of its own on
March 12, 2011 to establish a no-fly zone.72 It is also important to note that
despite this unanimous request by the League of Arab States, Resolution
1973 was adopted by the narrowest of margins, with five members of the
Council-Brazil, China, India, and the Russian Federation-abstaining in

67.

S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 59.

68.

Murphy, supra note 66, at 1137.

69.

See Brue Zagaris, ICC Issues Three Arrest Warrantsfor Gaddaft and Two Others, 27

INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 888 (Sept. 2011).

70.
Res. 1973].
71.

See generally S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter S.C.
Id. 14.

72.
As noted by Alain Juppe', the Foreign Minister of France, in a statement to the Security
Council before the vote on Resolution 1973 See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6498th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.6498 (Mar. 17, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498]. Also, in its preamble, Resolution 1973
takes note of
[T]he decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to
call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to
establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that
allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.
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the vote.73 In his statement before the vote, Alain Jupp6, the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the most important provisions of
the then draft resolution:
The draft resolution provides the Council with the means to
protect the civilian populations in Libya, first by establishing a
no-fly zone and by authorizing the members of the Arab League
and those Member States [of the United Nations] that so wish to
take the measures necessary to implement its provisions.
Furthermore, it authorized these same States to take all measures
necessary, over and above the no-fly zone, to protect civilians
and territories, including Benghazi, which are under the threat of
attack by Colonel Al-Qadhafi's forces. Lastly, it strengthens the
sanctions that have been adopted against the regime, including
implementing the arms embargo, freezing the assets of
4
authorities in Tripoli and prohibiting flights by Libyan airlines.7
All five of the member states of the Security Council who abstained in
the vote on Resolution 1973 made statements in explanation of their
abstentions.75 All of their statements indicated that the abstainers had
problems with Resolution 1973's authorization of the use of armed force to
implement the no-fly zone and especially, perhaps, with the resolution's
authorization of "all measures necessary, over and above the no-fly zone, to
5,76
protect civilians....
The representative of the Russian Federation made an especially
strong statement against the use of force. Favoring a peaceful settlement of
the situation in Libya, the Russian representative noted that "the passion of
some Council members for methods involving force prevailed. This is most
unfortunate and regrettable. Responsibility for the inevitable humanitarian
consequences of the excessive use of outside force in Libya will fall fair
and square on the shoulders of those who might undertake such action."
There was no peaceful settlement of the situation in Libya. On the
contrary, it was a fight to the death, and with the death of Colonel Gaddafi

73.
See id. at 3. The ten votes in favor of the resolution were one more than the nine votes,
including the concurring votes of all the permanent members, required by Article 27 (3) of the U.N.
Charter. Member states voting in favor were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon,
Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States.
74.

See id. at 3 (Statement of Alain Jupp6).

75.

See id. at 4-10.

76.

See id.

77.

U.N. Doc. S/PV.6498, supra note 72, at 8.
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on October 20, 2011, the fighting finally came to an end.78 The reports of
how he was killed, however, indicate that he was beaten, tortured and then
shot in the head and in both legs, after he was found hiding in a drain
outside the Libyan city of Sirte, his home town, where he and others had
taken shelter after their convoy was hit by a NATO airstrike as it attempted
to escape. 7 9 Gaddafi had the status of a prisoner of war when he was
captured. His murder therefore constituted a war crime, but there is no
evidence that those who committed this crime will ever be brought to
justice. Moreover, the circumstances of Gaddafi's death illustrate "the
challenges that lie ahead: the balancing of vengeance against justice,
impatience for jobs against the slow pace of economic recovery, fidelity to
Islam against tolerance for minorities, and the need for stability against the
drive to tear down of (sic) the pillars of old governments.,s
It is impossible to predict at this point future developments in Libya,
much less the fate of the so-called "Arab Spring," but it is worthwhile to
ponder how well or poorly the international community's actions with
respect to Libya have fared as an exercise of the responsibility to protect.
In my view, not well. First, it is debatable whether the primary motivation
behind the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1973 was to protect
the citizens of Libya. As noted above, the five states who abstained on the
resolution, especially China and the Russian Federation, both permanent
members of the Security Council, were extremely uncomfortable with
Resolution 1973's authorization of a no-fly zone and of measures going
beyond a no-fly zone if they were necessary to protect civilians and
civilian-populated areas under threat of attack. It seems highly likely that
China and the Russian Federation refrained from blocking the resolution
only because the Arab League had unanimously called for a no-fly zone and
neither state wished to offend the Arab states because of various important
interests they have in the Middle East. At the same time, it should be noted
that Resolution 1973 explicitly excludes "a foreign occupation force of any
form on any part of Libyan territory,"81 and all agreed that no foreign
ground troops would be put into Libya.82 The result was that NATO

78. Adam Gabbatt, Gaddafi Killed as Sirte Falls, GUARDIAN MIDDLEEASTLIVE BLOG, (Oct.
20, 2011, 5:13 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/middle-east-live/201 1/oct/20/gaddafi-killed-sirtefalls-live (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
79.

Id.

80.
David Kirkpatrick, Fate of Dictator Places Focus on Arab Springs "HardRoad," N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at Al.
81.

S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 70, 4.

82. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya
(Mar. 28, 2011).
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83

engaged in seven months of bombing in heavily urban areas, and one may
doubt that the effort to protect the civilians of Libya from attacks by
Gaddafi's forces was successful. Indeed, there were numerous reports that
NATO bombing itself resulted in excessive civilian casualties, and since
NATO did not have any troops on the ground in Libya, there was no
reliable method to verify the civilian casualty allegations." Noteworthy
also is that nothing was done to protect civilians from rebel attacks, and
there were reports of rebel forces committing numerous atrocities against
civilians in areas they had taken that were previously under the control of
Gaddafi forces.
Developments after the Security Council's action with respect to Libya
regarding the situation in Syria may also cause one to question whether R2P
has "come of age." There, in March 2011, an uprising in Syria against the
government of President Bashar al-Assad began and resulted in more than
2700 people, as of early October, being killed by Assad's armed forces. In
response, France, Germany, Portugal, and the United Kingdom introduced a
draft resolution, which would have condemned Syria's crackdown of the
uprising. The draft resolution received nine votes in favor, two votes
against--China and the Russian Federation-and four abstentions-Brazil,
India, Lebanon, and South Africa. The resolution therefore failed to be
adopted because of the double veto by China and the Russian Federation.88
The double veto took place even though the resolution had been modified to
eliminate "all but the most vague reference to sanctions as a future

possibility." 89

See Jonathan Beale, Counting the Cost ofNATO's Mission in Libya, BBC NEWS, (Oct. 31,
83.
2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15528984 (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
84. See John Glaser, NATO Refuses to Investigate Libyan Civilian Deaths, ANTIWAR.COM,
(Oct. 4, 2011), http://news.antiwar.com/2011/10/04/nato-refuses-to-investigate-libyan-civilian-deaths/
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
85.
Human Rights Watch reportedly claimed that rebels in the mountains in Libya's west
looted and damaged four towns seized from the forces of Colonel Gaddafi, as part of a series of abuses
and apparent reprisals against suspected loyalists that chased residents of these towns away. See C.J.
Shivers, Libyan Rebels Accused of Pillage and Beatings, N.Y. TIMES, (July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/world/africa/13Libya.html?ref=libya (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
86.

See S.C. Res. Draft, U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011).

See U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 6627th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627 (Oct. 4, 2011)
87.
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627].
88.
Id. at 2. The states voting in favor were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France,
Gabon, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States.
89. See Neil MacFarquhar, With Rare Double U.N. Veto on Syria, Russia and China Try to
ShieldFriendSyria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, at A6.
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In her statement following the vote, Susan Rice, the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, stated that the United States "is
outraged that this Council has utterly failed to address an urgent moral
challenge and a growing threat to regional peace and security.

. .

. Today

two members have vetoed a vastly watered-down text that does not even
mention sanctions."9 0 For his part the representative of the Russian
Federation was equally emphatic in his statement:
Of vital importance is the fact that at the heart of the Russian and
Chinese draft was the logic of respect for the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Syria as well as the principle of nonintervention, including military, in its affairs; the principle of the
unity of the Syrian people; refraining from confrontation; and
inviting all to an even-handed and comprehensive dialogue aimed
at achieving civil peace and national agreement by reforming the
socio-economic and political life of the country.
Today's draft was based on a very different philosophy- the
philosophy of confrontation.

. .

. Our proposals for wording on

the non-acceptability of foreign military intervention were not
taken into account, and based on the well known events in North
Africa, that can only put us on our guard. Equally alarming is the
weak wording in connection with the opposition and the lack of
an appeal to them to distance themselves from extremists....
The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council
The international
separately from the Libyan experience.
community is alarmed by statements that compliance with
Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO
interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in
implementing the responsibility to protect.

...

The demand for a

quick ceasefire [in Libya] turned into a full-fledged civil war, the
humanitarian, social, economic and military consequences of
which transcend Libyan borders. The situation in connection
with the no-fly zone has morphed into the bombing of oil
refineries, television stations and other civilian sites. The arms
embargo has morphed into a naval blockade in western Libya,
including a blockade of humanitarian goods. Today the tragedy
of Benghazi has spread to other western Libyan towns-Sirte and
Bani Walid. These types of models should be excluded from
global practices once and for all.9'
The representative from China urged "respect for the sovereignty of
Syria and resolving the crisis there through political dialogue" and stated
90.

See U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627, supra note 87, at 8.

91.

Id. at 3-4.
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China's belief that "under the current circumstances, sanctions or the threat
thereof does not help to resolve the question of Syria. . . .92 Equally
significant were the statements by the representatives of the states that
abstained on the resolution-Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa.9 3
The representative of India, for example, stated that the opposition forces in
Syria should:
[G]ive up the path of armed insurrection and engage
constructively with the authorities. We firmly believe that the
actions of the international community should facilitate
engagement of the Syrian Government and the opposition in a
Syrian-led inclusive political process, and not complicate the
situation by threats of sanctions, regime change, et cetera.94
Similar sentiments were expressed by the representatives of
Lebanon, 95 South Africa, and Brazil.
In short, with respect to the situation in Syria, not only China and
Russia, but also the emerging powers of Brazil, India, and South Africa do
not support the Security Council's action against Libya as a precedent to be
followed in future crises. Lebanon, to be sure, is a special case because of
the heavy influence Syria has on its domestic and international policies.
The situation in the Ivory Coast was, of course, not part of the Arab
Spring. It is, however, arguably the only other situation in which the
Security Council took action as an exercise of the R2P.
C. The Ivory Coast and R2P
The background to the situation in the Ivory Coast is complex and
For present purposes, it
multifaceted and has been set forth elsewhere.
suffices to highlight a few key developments. In particular, it should be
noted that in an effort to end internal armed conflict, Ivorian political forces
signed an agreement to that end on January 24, 2003. For its part, the
Security Council created an international peacekeeping force to oversee the
implementation of the agreement, the United Nations Operation in Cote
92.

Id. at 5.

93.

See generally U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627, supra note 87.

94.

Id. at 6.
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Id. at 10.
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98. See Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Cote d'Iviore,
Libya and the Responsibility to Protect,87.4 INT'L AFF. 825 (2011).
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d'Ivoire (UNOCI).99 The mandate of UNOCI included the protection of
"civilians under imminent threat of physical violence," 100 and it was
authorized to use "all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its
capabilities and its areas of deployment."' 0 ' Unfortunately, "UNOCI
proved to have insufficient capabilities to protect civilians, even though it
was supported by several thousand French soldiers stationed in the Ivory
Coast prior to the outbreak of armed conflict."l 02 The crucial phase of the
conflict, however, arose after the principal parties disputed the results of the
This
long-postponed presidential election of November 28, 2010.103
resulted in renewed armed conflict between the supporters of the incumbent
President Laurent Gbagbo and his challenger Alassane Ouattara. When
"early election returns suggest[ed] [an] Ouattara victory, Gbagbo's
representatives prevented dissemination of the result. In the meantime, the
Constitutional Council of the Ivory Coast declared that there had been
massive vote-rigging in the north and cancelled 660,000 votes for Ouattara,
thereby handing the election to Gbagbo."1" Based on a briefing from the
Secretary-General's Special Representative on the Ivory Coast, however,
who insisted that Ouattara had won, the Security Council adopted a
resolution formally supporting this view and urging the parties to accept
this result. 05
The parties did not accept this result, however, and the situation
deteriorated further with an increase in violence. In response, on March 30,
2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1975.os The
resolution recognized Ouattara as president, condemned Gbagbo's refusal
to negotiate a settlement, and authorized UNOCI to "use all necessary
means" to protect civilians, including by "prevent[ing] the use of heavy
07
weapons against the civilian population."o'
Although Resolution 1975 was adopted unanimously, in statements
following the voting, Council members presented sharply different
interpretations of the text. 0 8 For example, the representative of the United

99.

S.C. Res. 1528, $ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004).
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Kingdom noted that the resolution reaffirmed the "robust mandate" of
UNOCI to use "all necessary means" to protect civilians and recognized the
need to prevent "the use of heavy weapons against civilians."' 0 9 By
contrast, the representative of China stated that:
China always believes that United Nations peacekeeping
operations should strictly abide by the principle of neutrality.
We hope that the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire will
fulfill its mandate in a strict and comprehensive manner, help to
peacefully settle the crisis in Cote d'Ivoire and avoid becoming a
party to the conflict.'" 0
India, for its part, contended that United Nations peacekeepers "cannot be
made instruments of regime change.""'
Despite these interpretations of Resolution 1975 by the Chinese and
Indian representatives, UNOCI, aided by French forces, used military force
to engage in regime change. In April 2011, the Gbagbo forces were
defeated, and he was arrested by U.N. peacekeepers, no French forces
having participated in the arrest.112
As noted by Bellamy and Williams:
[The] use of force by U.N. peacekeepers and French troops
blurred the lines between human protection and regime change
and raised questions about the role of the U.N. in overriding Cote
d'Ivoire's Constitutional Council, about the proper interpretation
of Resolution 1975, and about the place of neutrality and
impartiality in U.N. peacekeeping." 3
The UNOCI and French operations were sharply criticized by Thabo
Mbeki, the former president of South Africa, and by the Russian

Federation."14
There have been some interesting developments since the arrest of
Gbagbo. In particular, on November 30, 2011, Gbagbo was unexpectedly
handed over to international custody and flown overnight to The Hague,

109. See id. at 6.
110. Id. at 7.
Ill. Id.at3.
112. See Steven Erlanger, French Colonial PastCast Long Shadow Over Policy in Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, at A10.
113. See Bellamy & Williams, supra note 98, at 835.
114. Id.
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where the prosecutor of the ICC accused him of crimes against humanity."s
Gbagbo was served with an arrest warrant from the court in the small
northern town of Korogho, where he had been under house arrest for seven
months.1 6 Additional arrest warrants are expected in connection with postelection violence in the Ivory Coast. The prosecutor of the ICC has opened
investigations into the actions of other members of the Gbagbo government,
as well as figures from Mr. Ouattara's government."' Forces supporting
Mr. Ouattara also committed atrocities, according to prosecution evidence
and reports from human rights groups."'
By contrast, the National Transitional Council (NTC), which is
currently ruling Libya, is reportedly resisting efforts by the prosecutor of
the ICC to have Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of Colonel Gaddafi's sons, and
Abdullan Senussi, the intelligence chief for Colonel Gaddafi, handed over
for trial before the ICC." 9 Gaddafi and Senussi are both charged with
crimes against humanity, and the NTC had promised to hand them over to
the ICC to face trial in The Hague.12 0 The NTC now reportedly wants to try
the two men in Libyan courts.12' A major stumbling block to such a trial is
that the NTC wishes to preserve the death penalty for the trial, which is not
available in a trial before the ICC and which is strongly opposed by many
members of the international community.12 2 Another major problem is that
Libya does not currently have the legal infrastructure and knowledge
necessary to conduct a fair trial.123
III. A FEW CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As suggested earlier in this essay, much more attention needs to be
addressed to fulfillment of the responsibility to prevent, which both ICISS
and Evans have emphasized as the most important component of the R2P.
For its part, the World Summit Outcome document shifts the focus from the
prosecution of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
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humanity to their prevention.' 24 Sadly, however, most interventions come
too late to prevent these crimes and end up being a reaction to an outbreak
of violence.125 What is needed are more effective efforts to build state
capacity, remedy grievances, and ensure the rule of law, especially efforts
to build a rule of law perspective into local cultures.
Notably, the World Summit Outcome document contains no reference
to the responsibility to rebuild. But this is the responsibility facing the
international community in both Libya and the Ivory Coast. As Evans has
cautioned, however, this is a difficult responsibility to fulfill.12 6
As noted previously, one may be skeptical, especially with respect to
Libya, but perhaps with respect to the Ivory Coast as well, about how
successful the international community was in protecting civilians in these
conflicts. At this juncture, prospects with respect to protection of civilians
in Syria seem especially grim. One hopes that the situation in Syria can be
resolved short of the bloody civil war that took place in Libya, but it is
difficult to be optimistic.
The R2P, as developed by the ICISS and Evans in his treatise, has
much to commend it. Sadly, however, when I think of the R2P, I am
reminded of Mahatma Gandhi, who, when asked what he thought of
western civilization, reportedly replied, "Ithink it would be a good idea."1 2 7
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the violence into a mass atrocity. It failed, however, to prevent the death of 1300 persons and the
displacement of thousands more). I am grateful to Kish Vinayagamoorthy for bringing this incident to
my attention.
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127. Mahatma Gandhi, Indian political and spiritual leader, when asked what he thought of
Western civilization.

